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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(“IDEA”) broadly authorizes the courts to provide appropriate 
relief, including compensatory education, to children who 
have been deprived by their state or local educational 
agencies of a free appropriate public education.  When 
Congress reauthorized the IDEA in 2004, it enacted 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(f)(3)(C), a statute of limitations that requires parents 
to file a due process complaint no more than two years after 
the parents “knew or should have known” about the alleged 
deprivation, that is, within two years of the reasonable 
discovery of that violation.2  The legislation simultaneously 
amended 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B), which previews the 
various procedural safeguards available to parents, including 
the opportunity to file that due process complaint.  The new 
language added to this prefatory subsection, however, 
described the due process complaint as alleging an injury that 
occurred not more than two years before the reasonable 
discovery date.   
                                                                                                     
School of Law-Newark for their helpful perspective and 
excellent briefing and argument in this case. 
 2 The parties here, like some district courts in our 
Circuit, referred to the reasonable discovery date as the 
“KOSHK date.”  See, e.g., Jana K. ex rel. Tim K. v. Annville-
Cleona Sch. Dist., 39 F. Supp. 3d 584, 596 (M.D. Pa. 2014). 
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In an appeal stemming from a due process complaint 
filed by the parents of G.L., a student with special needs, we 
consider, in a matter of first impression among the Courts of 
Appeals, how these two provisions should be interpreted 
together and what effect they have on the courts’ authority to 
remedy IDEA violations, in particular, through the award of 
compensatory education.  We address today which, of a 
variety of interpretations, is correct:  Does § 1415(b)(6)(B) 
limit compensatory education to injuries occurring two years 
before the filing of the complaint, even if earlier injuries are 
claimed within two years of their reasonable discovery, as 
urged by Appellant Ligonier Valley School District 
Authority?  Does it limit compensatory education to injuries 
that occurred from two years before their reasonable 
discovery through the filing of the complaint, up to two years 
after that discovery, i.e., the “2+2” approach taken by the 
District Court and urged by G.L.?  Does it impose only a 
pleading requirement, without affecting the availability of a 
remedy for timely and well-pleaded claims, as argued by 
Amici Appellees and G.L. in the alternative?  Or is it simply a 
restatement, albeit ill-phrased, of the same two-year statute of 
limitations set forth in § 1415(f)(3)(C), as asserted by the 
United States Department of Education (“DOE”)?  
Recognizing the uncertainty in this area, the District Court 
certified the question for interlocutory appeal. 
We now conclude, after careful consideration of the 
parties’ plain language arguments, the statutory context and 
structure, the DOE’s interpretive guidance, and the legislative 
history, that § 1415(b)(6)(B) is simply an inartful attempt to 
mirror § 1415(f)(3)(C)’s two-year statute of limitations.  That 
is, both sections reflect the same two-year filing deadline for 
a due process complaint after the reasonable discovery of an 
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injury, and § 1415(b)(6)(B) neither imposes a pleading 
requirement nor in any respect alters the courts’ broad power 
under the IDEA to provide a complete remedy for the 
violation of a child’s right to a free appropriate public 
education. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
A. G.L.’s Schooling 
After spending the previous year at a parochial school, 
G.L. entered high school in the Ligonier Valley School 
District (the “District”) in the fall of 2008.3  At a school open 
house shortly after he started, G.L.’s teacher told his father 
that G.L. seemed distracted in class and lacked organizational 
skills.  G.L.’s father then orally requested that the District 
evaluate G.L. for any special education needs.  The request 
was to no avail:  No evaluation was conducted and, instead, in 
the wake of a tragic car accident in which G.L. lost his older 
sister, the District, purportedly on the basis of information in 
her obituary, opened an investigation into whether G.L. even 
lived within District boundaries. That investigation confirmed 
G.L.’s residence and thus the District’s obligation under the 
IDEA to provide him with a free appropriate public education 
(“FAPE”).   
In the meantime, however, G.L. continued to struggle 
academically.  For a time, he was able to keep those struggles 
                                              
 3 We review the allegations of the complaint and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to G.L., the non-moving party.  See D.E. v. Cent. 
Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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partially hidden from his parents by intercepting and altering 
his report card.  At the conclusion of the 2008-09 school year, 
however, District officials informed G.L.’s parents that he 
would need to repeat the ninth grade.  It was at this point that 
his parents learned that he was being bullied at school on the 
basis of his sexual orientation, with students regularly calling 
him a “faggot” and a “homo,” and that as a result he was 
having trouble eating, sleeping, and concentrating on his 
studies.   
Faced with the District’s contention that G.L. should 
repeat the ninth grade, G.L.’s parents complained to the 
school principal about the bullying and again requested that 
G.L. be evaluated for special education needs.  The 
conversation became heated, and the principal told G.L.’s 
father to speak with the parents of the bullying students 
himself.  The principal also informed G.L.’s parents that a 
request for special education evaluation needed to be in 
writing.  G.L.’s father then immediately handwrote and 
submitted a request, which G.L.’s mother followed up with an 
email to the principal.  Apparently not caring for the tone of 
that email, the principal made an angry phone call to each of 
G.L.’s parents.  The same day, the principal requested that the 
District again investigate the residency of G.L. and his 
family.   
The District then began another investigation, 
representing to the family that the new investigation was 
based on an anonymous phone call to the District.  
Meanwhile, the principal also conducted his own ad-hoc 
investigation, using school computers to search for voting 
records of G.L.’s parents.  Over the next month, it appears 
little was done to assist G.L. with the challenges he faced 
either academically or socially.  The District did, however, 
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demand that the family provide a number of additional 
documents to prove residency.  Eventually, the District 
agreed to formally evaluate G.L. for the remedial support to 
which he might be entitled pursuant to the IDEA, and in 
August 2009, after the family hired an attorney, yet again 
confirmed that G.L. lived within District boundaries.   
 Thus, when G.L. returned to school in the fall, the 
District finally evaluated him for his special education needs 
for the 2009-10 school year and instituted a plan to prevent 
him from being bullied.  That evaluation revealed that G.L. 
did indeed have learning disabilities in math, reading, and 
writing.  In November 2009, the District offered to G.L.’s 
parents an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”), which 
G.L.’s parents found inadequate and sought to supplement 
with supports tied to each of G.L.’s special needs.  Despite 
multiple meetings between the parents and District officials 
during the months of December and January, they were 
unable to agree on the educational goals that would satisfy a 
FAPE for G.L.    
While the parties were attempting to negotiate a 
satisfactory IEP over the fall and winter, the District also 
attempted to implement a plan to prevent G.L. from being 
bullied.  However, by January 2010, the bullying not only had 
continued, but had grown to include the participation of the 
school’s football coach, who allegedly made a disparaging 
remark to another student about that student’s relationship 
with G.L., and did so in front of some of the very students 
who were bullying G.L.  When he learned of this public 
remark by the coach, G.L. became distraught and refused to 
return to school.  Instead, his parents picked up and returned 
his school work, which he completed at home.  As this went 
on, G.L.’s IEP team continued to meet, and his parents were 
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in regular contact with District officials to attempt to address 
the bullying situation.   
In March 2010, G.L. was evaluated by an intermediate 
unit psychologist, who conditionally diagnosed him with two 
additional disabilities, including post-traumatic stress disorder 
caused by the ongoing bullying.  On March 8, 2010, 
frustrated with the bullying that had been allowed to escalate 
and apparently had caused additional disabilities in their 
child, upset by his academic struggles, and dissatisfied with 
the IEP offered by the District, G.L.’s parents withdrew him 
from the school and enrolled him in a cyber charter school.  
The District has conceded that March 9, 2010 reflects the date 
G.L.’s parents “knew or should have known” about the 
deprivation of a free appropriate public education to G.L., 
that is, the reasonable discovery date for purposes of this 
case.4  
On January 9, 2012, within two years of the reasonable 
discovery date, and thus within the statute of limitations set 
forth in § 1415(f)(3)(C), G.L.’s parents filed their due process 
complaint, alleging that the District denied him a FAPE and 
requesting compensatory education for September 2008 
through March 2010—that is, the entire period that G.L. was 
allegedly denied a FAPE by the District before he withdrew 
from school.   
                                              
4 The District has not disputed at any point during 
these protracted proceedings, including on appeal, that March 
9, 2010 was the reasonable discovery date.  Having not raised 
such an argument to date, the District has waived it in any 
event.  See Del. Strong Families v. Att’y Gen. of Del., 793 
F.3d 304, 310 n.5 (3d Cir. 2015). 
9 
 
B. Procedural History 
As required by the IDEA, G.L.’s parents initially 
requested their due process hearing by filing a complaint with 
the Pennsylvania Department of Education, which in turn 
assigned it to a Hearing Officer.  The Hearing Officer 
acknowledged that the language of § 1415 seemed to describe 
two different time periods relevant to the IDEA’s statute of 
limitations: 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C), which provides that a 
due process complaint must be filed no more than two years 
after the reasonable discovery date, and 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(b)(6)(B), which describes the due process complaint 
as alleging an injury that occurred not more than two years 
before the reasonable discovery date.   However, the Hearing 
Officer adopted the District’s position that the subsections, 
first, were actually the “same,” and, second, barred relief for 
violations that occurred more than two years before the 
complaint was filed.  Put differently, the Hearing Officer 
adopted an effective two year remedy cap, compensating only 
injuries that actually occurred within two years of the filing 
date, regardless of whether the parents filed within two years 
of reasonably discovering older injuries.   
Applying this interpretation to G.L.’s complaint, the 
Hearing Officer held that—even assuming that the District 
deprived G.L. of a FAPE from September 2008 until March 
9, 2010, that the parents reasonably did not know about the 
injury before March 9, 2010, and that the January 9, 2012 
complaint was timely filed within two years of that March 9, 
2010 discovery—G.L.’s remedy was limited to injuries that 
occurred in the three months between January 2010 and 
March 2010 because that was the only period G.L. attended 
the District school within the two-year window before the 
filing of the complaint.  Because the Hearing Officer 
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proceeded to hold that G.L. was not injured during this 
period, i.e., that the District had provided a FAPE to G.L. 
during the 2009-2010 school year, the Hearing Officer denied 
any award of compensatory education, even for those three 
months.5   
The District Court, reviewing this decision, disagreed.  
In denying the District’s motion to partially dismiss the 
complaint on the basis of the alleged remedy cap, the District 
Court construed § 1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B), in 
combination, to mean that G.L.’s relief may extend from two 
years before the reasonable discovery date through the date 
the complaint was filed, which could be up to two years after 
the reasonable discovery date, for a maximum period of relief 
of four years.  G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., No. 
13-34, 2013 WL 6858963, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2013).  
The District Court thus adopted what has become known as 
the “2+2” construction of these statutory sections, id. at *4-6, 
applying the same construction embraced by three other 
district courts in this Circuit, see M. v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 
No. 12-3646, 2015 WL 221086, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 
2015); Jana K., 39 F. Supp. 3d at 596-600; I.H. ex rel D.S. v. 
                                              
5 Given his interpretation of the statute of limitations 
provision, the Hearing Officer did not have occasion to 
address the parents’ contention that G.L. was denied a free 
appropriate public education throughout the 2008-2009 
school year.  He did, however, hold that the District had 
discriminated against and had retaliated against G.L. in 





Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 773-74 
(M.D. Pa. 2012).  Because the 2+2 construction would render 
G.L.’s injuries from September 2008 to January 2010 
redressable upon finding a violation, the District Court 
remanded for the Hearing Officer to address whether the 
District provided G.L. a FAPE during the relevant period.  
2013 WL 6858963, at *6.  However, recognizing the 
uncertainty in this area and correctly identifying this issue as 
one that was “important, controlling, and recurring,” id., the 
District Court stayed its remand order and certified the issue 
for interlocutory appeal, which we then granted.6   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).   
The District Court’s construction of § 1415(f)(3)(C) 
and § 1415(b)(6)(B) presents a legal question over which we 
apply plenary review.  See P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. 
Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 735 (3d Cir. 2009). 
                                              
6 Because the District Court remanded on this basis, it 
did not address the Hearing Officer’s finding that, 
notwithstanding the disturbing manner in which the District 
treated G.L. and his family, the District did not deprive G.L. a 
FAPE during the 2009-2010 school year. 
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III. The Individuals With Disabilities Act 
A. Statutory Overview 
The IDEA is intended to ensure that every child with 
special needs is afforded a “free appropriate public education 
designed to meet [those] unique needs,” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(d)(1)(A), through the statute’s “comprehensive . . . 
remedial scheme,” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 
791, 803 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  The law ensures that right 
“by mandating that public educational institutions identify 
and effectively educate those children, or pay for their 
education elsewhere if they require specialized services that 
the public institution cannot provide.”  P.P., 585 F.3d at 735.   
Once a child is identified as having special needs, “[a] 
school district provides a FAPE by designing and 
implementing an individualized instructional program set 
forth in an [IEP], which ‘must be reasonably calculated to 
enable the child to receive meaningful educational benefits in 
light of the student’s intellectual potential.’”  Id. at 729-30 
(quoting Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 
194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004)).  To the extent a school district fails 
to provide a student with a FAPE, a parent may file a due 
process complaint on behalf of his or her child, with a 
subsequent hearing held before an administrative hearing 
officer.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f)(1)(A); D.E., 765 F.3d at 
274.  A party dissatisfied with the result of that hearing may 
then file an action in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(2); D.E., 765 F.3d at 274.   
Under the IDEA, a “district court is authorized to grant 
‘such relief as the court determines is appropriate,’ including 
attorneys’ fees, reimbursement for a private educational 
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placement, and compensatory education.”  A.W., 486 F.3d at 
802 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)).  Compensatory 
education “aim[s] to place disabled children in the same 
position they would have occupied but for the school 
district’s violations of IDEA,” by providing the educational 
services children should have received in the first instance.   
Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 
2005).  This “judicially-created remedy . . . has received the 
imprimatur of this Court,” D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. 
of Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012), and reflects the 
“broad discretion,” Bucks Cnty. Dep’t of Mental 
Health/Mental Retardation v. Pennsylvania, 379 F.3d 61, 67 
(3d Cir. 2004), that Congress has granted to the courts “to 
remedy the deprivation of the right to a free appropriate 
education,” Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 536 
(3d Cir. 1995).  
B. The 2004 Reenactment and Its 
Aftermath 
Prior to 2004, the IDEA did not include a statute of 
limitations.  See Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 
411, 413 (3d Cir. 2010).  Congress found this problematic 
because parents could knowingly wait for many years to file 
complaints, resulting in school districts that were “often 
surprised by claims . . . involving issues that occurred in an 
elementary school program when the child may currently be a 
high school student.”  H.R. Rep, 108-77, at 115 (2003).  
Waiting many years to bring actions on behalf of a child, 
Congress reasoned, jeopardized that child’s education and 
created distrust between school administrators and parents.  
Id.   
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In the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA, Congress 
sought to remedy this problem by adding a statute of 
limitations to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), which is entitled 
“Impartial due process hearing” and sets forth the procedures 
for the life cycle of such hearings, from the initial receipt of 
the due process complaint that constitutes the request for the 
hearing, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1), through the findings of the 
hearing officer, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E).  The new 
subsection, § 1415(f)(3)(C), was entitled “Timeline for 
requesting hearing” and states: 
A parent or agency shall request an impartial 
due process hearing within 2 years of the date 
the parent or agency knew or should have 
known about the alleged action that forms the 
basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an 
explicit time limitation for requesting such a 
hearing under this subchapter, in such time as 
the State law allows. 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C).  Accordingly, under the IDEA 
parents must file their due process complaint within two years 
of the date they “knew or should have known” of the 
violation, unless the state has its own statute of limitations, in 
which case the state’s statute controls.  Id.; D.K. v. Abington 
Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2012).  The 
reauthorization also added two equitable tolling exceptions to 
this statute of limitations, which apply regardless of whether 
the state has enacted its own statute of limitations: specific 
misrepresentations by the school district and the withholding 
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of statutorily mandated disclosures.  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(f)(3)(D).7   
Section 1415 overall is a lengthy and detailed section, 
the “entire purpose” of which “is to provide parents 
‘procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free 
appropriate public education.’”  D.M. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ.,  
--- F.3d ----, No. 14-4044, 2015 WL 5255088, at *5 (3d Cir. 
Sept. 10, 2015) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)).8  The section 
opens with § 1415(a), entitled “Establishment of procedures,” 
which requires state and local educational agencies to 
“establish and maintain procedures in accordance with this 
section to ensure that children with disabilities and their 
parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to 
the provision of a free appropriate public education” by these 
agencies.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).  It proceeds in § 1415(b), 
entitled “Types of procedures,” to list out and briefly 
summarize “[t]he procedures required by this section,” 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(b), (b)(2)-(8), in roughly the same order these 
procedures are then more fully described in the subsections 
that follow, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)-(f).  Among the procedures 
listed in § 1415(b), even before the 2004 reenactment, was 
“an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any 
matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational 
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate 
public education to such child,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) 
                                              
7 These exceptions are not at issue in this case. 
8 We describe in some detail here the structure of this 
section because, as will become apparent, it provides 




(1999) (amended 2004), corresponding to the fuller 
explanation of the due process hearing procedures set forth in 
§ 1415(f) (1999) (amended 2004).     
Accordingly, along with the addition of the statute of 
limitations to § 1415(f)(3)(C), the 2004 reenactment also 
amended § 1415(b)(6) to read: 
(b) Types of procedures 
The procedures required by this section shall 
include the following: . . .  
(6) An opportunity for any party to 
present a complaint— 
(A) with respect to any matter 
relating to the identification, 
evaluation, or educational 
placement of the child, or the 
provision of a free appropriate 
public education to such child; 
and 
(B) which sets forth an alleged 
violation that occurred not 
more than 2 years before the 
date the parent or public agency 
knew or should have known 
about the alleged action that 
forms the basis of the 
complaint, or, if the State has an 
explicit time limitation for 
presenting such a complaint 
17 
 
under this subchapter, in such 
time as the State law allows, 
except that the exceptions to the 
timeline described in subsection 
(f)(3)(D) shall apply to the 
timeline described in this 
subparagraph. 
20 U.S.C § 1415(b)(6) (emphasis added).  With this 
amendment, the complaint procedure described at 
§ 1415(b)(6)(B) came to mirror the statute of limitations at 
§ 1415(f)(3)(C) in almost all respects: they both describe a 
two-year time limit that hinges on the reasonable discovery 
date; they both provide that any state statute of limitations 
will override this timeline; and they both incorporate the two 
exceptions to the statute of limitations set forth in 
§ 1415(f)(3)(D).9 Unlike § 1415(f)(3)(C), however, 
                                              
9 While § 1415(b)(6)(B) describes “present[ing] a 
complaint,” and § 1415(f)(3)(C) describes “request[ing] an 
impartial due process hearing,” both sections address the 
filing of the same due process complaint because there is no 
dispute that presenting a complaint is merely the vehicle by 
which a due process hearing is requested.  See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(f)(1)(A) (noting that a hearing is held “[w]henever a 
complaint has been received under subsection (b)(6)”); see 
also United States Department of Education, Questions and 
Answers on IDEA Part B Dispute Resolution Procedures, 
OSEP Memo 13-08, 34 (2013) (explaining that “[t]he IDEA 
Amendments of 2004 made significant changes to IDEA’s 
due process procedures, and parties no longer have the right 
to request a due process hearing directly” but instead “first 
must file a due process complaint”). 
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§ 1415(b)(6)(B)’s two-year limitations period runs backward 
instead of forward from the reasonable discovery date.   
 The differences in the language of these provisions and 
the fact that they appear to move in opposite directions from 
the reasonable discovery date, has given rise to confusion in 
the wake of the 2004 reenactment, with district courts within 
this Circuit interpreting them in a range of ways.  Some have 
construed them to limit redress to the two years preceding a 
complaint.  See, e.g., D.C. v. Mount Olive Twp. Bd. of Educ., 
No. 12-5592, 2014 WL 1293534, *21-22 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 
2014).  Some have interpreted them to impose a filing 
deadline but not to limit the remedy for timely-filed claims.  
See, e.g., Cent. Sch. Dist. v. K.C. ex rel. S.C., No. 11-6869, 
2013 WL 3367484, at *12 n.6 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 2013) 
(collecting cases) (“We also agree with the conclusion 
reached by several courts within this district, that the IDEA’s 
statute of limitations does not apply to limit the permissible 
period of compensatory educational awards.”).  And at least 
four, including the District Court here, have adopted the 2+2 
analysis.  See, e.g., G.L., 2013 WL 6858963, at *3-6. 
 The District contends there can be no confusion 
because we have already addressed and resolved the question 
of how these provisions interact with each other and how they 
apply to claims dating back a number of years in Steven I., 
618 F.3d 411, and D.K., 696 F.3d 233.  That resolution, 
according to the District, is that we “definitively stated that 
claims are barred where they are alleged to occur two years 
prior to the date of filing.”  Appellant’s Br. 8 (citing Steven I., 
618 F.3d at 417, and D.K., 696 F.3d at 254). This argument 
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of our prior cases.  
Those cases held that § 1415(f)(3)(C) bars claims that are not 
filed within two years after the parents “knew or should have 
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known” about the injury—a proposition that is now well-
established and is not disputed by either party to this case.  
However, neither Steven I. nor D.K. says anything about 
claims that are filed within two years of that “knew or should 
have known” date but happen to relate to an injury that took 
place more than two years before the complaint was filed.  
In Steven I., we considered a case brought by parents 
who had knowingly sat on a claim for years, see Mark v. 
Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., No. 08-571, 2009 WL 415767, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2009), rev’d and remanded sub nom. 
Steven I., 618 F.3d at 417, and held that § 1415(f)(3)(C)’s 
two-year statute of limitations applies retroactively to claims 
that predated the 2004 amendments and “bars any causes of 
action that accrued prior to” two years before the filing of the 
due process complaint, even if the violation continues into the 
two-year window before the complaint was filed.  618 F.3d at 
417 (emphasis added).  Likewise, in D.K., where we held that 
the statutory tolling provisions of § 1415(f)(3)(D) precluded 
application of common law tolling doctrines and were 
therefore the exclusive exceptions to the IDEA’s two-year 
statute of limitations, we reaffirmed our rejection of the 
“continuing violation” doctrine and held that the claims in 
that case, which we observed had been discovered years 
earlier, were, as the parents conceded, “limited to the two-
year time period” before the filing of the complaint under 
§ 1415(f)(3)(C).  D.K, 696 F.3d at 248, 254.  Indeed, contrary 
to the District’s reading, we expressly stated in D.K. that 
parents must request a due process hearing, not within two 
years of the occurrence of the injury, but “within two years of 
‘the date the parent . . . knew or should have known about the 
alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint.’”  Id. at 
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244 (alterations in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(f)(3)(C)).   
 Although we observed in passing in D.K. that this two-
year statute of limitations in § 1415(f)(3)(C) was “the same” 
two-year period that parents had to file an administrative 
complaint under § 1415(b)(6)(B), id., we did not there and 
have not since had occasion to reconcile the differences 
between the language of § 1415(b)(6)(B) and § 1415(f)(3)(C) 
or to consider how these provisions affect the remedy 
available for claims spanning multiple years that were filed 
within two years of the date the parents first “knew or should 
have known” about the basis for those claims.  Nor has any 
other Court of Appeals addressed the interplay between 
§ 1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B).  We resolve these issues 
today. 
IV. Analysis 
 The starting point of all statutory construction is the 
text of the statute, but where that text is ambiguous, “we 
‘must do our best, bearing in mind the fundamental canon of 
statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read 
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme.’”  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 
(2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. 
Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014)).  Thus, we consider below (1) the 
plain language arguments of the parties and amici; (2) the 
broader context of the statute; (3) the position of the DOE; 
and (4) the legislative history of the 2004 amendments, and 
we conclude that applying the plain language of the text 
would force us to give § 1415(b)(6)(B) a meaning that “turns 
out to be untenable in light of the statute as a whole.’”  King, 
135 S. Ct. at 2495 (internal quotations marks and alteration 
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omitted).  Instead, our analysis confirms that, as we presaged 
in D.K., § 1415(b)(6)(B) and § 1415(f)(3)(C) do indeed 
reflect “the same” statute of limitations, 696 F.3d at 244, 
which imposes a deadline on the filing of claims once they 
are reasonably discovered but does not limit the redress 
available for timely-filed claims. 
A. The Plain Language of § 1415(b)(6)(B) 
Is Ambiguous 
 In interpreting § 1415(b)(6)(B), we confront a 
statutory provision that by its plain terms does not impose any 
obligation on parents, but rather identifies the “opportunity 
. . . to present a complaint” among a list of procedural 
safeguards in the prefatory subsection of § 1415, which are 
then explicated in the subsections that follow.  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(b)(6)(B).  Meanwhile, the amendment to § 
1415(f)(3)(C) by its plain terms describes the “[t]imeline for 
requesting [a] hearing” and mandates that “[a] parent . . . shall 
request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years” of 
the reasonable discovery date.  The amendment to 
§ 1415(b)(6)(B) appears to conform the description of the 
complaint that previously appeared in § 1415(b)(6), i.e., the 
mechanism to “request an impartial due process hearing,” to 
§ 1415(f)(3)(C) in every respect—including the exceptions—
but one: the timeframe of before, rather than after, the 
reasonable discovery date.  Id. § 1415(b)(6)(B), (f)(3)(C).  No 
explanation is given for this singular difference.  The clearest 
way to demonstrate the ambiguity it has created in the statute, 
however, is through the diametrically opposed interpretations 
proposed by the parties themselves.   
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i. The School District’s Proposed 
Remedy Cap 
We begin with the District, which contends, first, that 
§ 1415(b)(6)(B) describes the same two-year statute of 
limitations as § 1415(f)(3)(C) and, second, that this statute of 
limitations limits the scope of a child’s remedy to those 
injuries that actually occurred in the two years before the 
filing of a complaint, no matter when the parent reasonably 
discovered the injury.  The obvious problem with the 
District’s first contention is that, as the District Court noted in 
rejecting it, the language and plain meaning of the 
subsections are, in fact, quite different:  Section 1415(f)(3)(C) 
provides that parents who have been unable to secure relief 
for alleged violations through informal channels and are 
resorting to requesting a due process hearing must do so 
“within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or 
should have known about the alleged action that forms the 
basis of the complaint.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C).  Section 
1415(b)(6)(B), on the other hand, describes that very same 
complaint that parents shall have the opportunity to present as 
“set[ting] forth an alleged violation that occurred not more 
than 2 years before the date the parent or public agency knew 
or should have known about the alleged action that forms the 
basis of the complaint.”  Id. § 1415(b)(6)(B). 
The District does not attempt to reconcile the language 
of these provisions; it simply asks us ipse dixit to declare 
them identical and further asks that we read this single statute 
of limitations to permit relief only for those injuries that 
occurred no more than two years before the filing of the 
complaint.  The problem is that this is not what the statute 
says and the District’s logic proves an unworkable syllogism: 
Section 1415(b)(6)(B) makes reference to (a) injuries that 
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occurred no more than two years before (b) the reasonable 
discovery date; § 1415(f)(3)(C) provides that (b) this 
reasonable discovery date must be no more than two years 
before (c) the filing of the complaint; but neither subsection 
references (a) injuries that occurred no more than two years 
before (c) the filing of the complaint.   
The District’s reading not only lacks textual support 
but affirmatively contravenes the language and purpose of 
Congress in using a reasonable discovery date.  When 
fashioning a statute of limitations, a legislature may choose as 
the date from which the limitations period begins to run either 
the date the injury actually occurred, an approach known as 
the “occurrence rule,” or the date the aggrieved party knew or 
should have known of the injury, that is, the “discovery rule.”  
See Knopick v. Connelly, 639 F.3d 600, 607 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(discussing these rules in the context of Pennsylvania tort 
law); see also Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 
38 F.3d 1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that the 
discovery rule provides that the date the statute of limitations 
begins to run “is not the date on which the wrong that injures 
the plaintiff occurs, but the date on which the plaintiff 
discovers that he or she has been injured”).  Under the 
discovery rule, a plaintiff’s time to bring suit is not in any 
way shortened by his or her reasonable ignorance: “the 
statutory limitations period begins to run and the plaintiff is 
afforded the full limitations period, starting from the point of 
[discovery], in which to file his or her claim.”  Oshiver, 38 
F.3d at 1386.10 
                                              
10 We have acknowledged there are different views as 
to whether the discovery rule is properly characterized as 
delaying the date of claim accrual or as tolling the limitations 
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The discovery rule controls here.  Generally, “absen[t] 
. . . a contrary directive from Congress, we apply the federal 
discovery rule” as a default.  Disabled in Action of Pa. v. 
SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Here, of course, Congress left nothing to 
doubt, unambiguously providing in the IDEA that the date 
from which any limitations period begins to run is the date the 
parents “knew or should have known” of the basis for the 
claim.  See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6)(B), (f)(3)(C).  The 
District thus does not argue that the occurrence rule applies, 
nor could it, because to do so would be contrary to the 
IDEA’s explicit, twice-repeated discovery rule.  Instead, it 
attempts an end run around the rule by proposing a two-year 
cap on redress from the date of the complaint, with the same 
effect: the requirement that a claim be filed within two years 
of the date the violation actually occurred (not the date it was 
reasonably discovered) for that claim to be cognizable.  
Take a practical example.  Assume a school district 
unreasonably fails to identify a child’s disability from the 
beginning of first grade through the end of third grade.  
Assume also that at the end of third grade, the parents first 
reasonably discover the injury, and the school district 
immediately begins providing the student with the 
                                                                                                     
period for a claim that accrued upon occurrence of the injury, 
and recently have held that the federal discovery rule is 
properly viewed as the latter.  See William A. Graham Co. v. 
Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 150 (3d Cir. 2011).  This distinction 
is immaterial to our resolution here, for “[t]he distinction 
between the two concepts . . . makes no difference for 
purposes of deciding whether a claim survives a statute-of-
limitations defense.” Id. at 148.   
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educational supports he or she needs going forward but 
declines to provide that child with compensatory education to 
make up for the three years the child was deprived a FAPE.  
Under the theory espoused by the District, even if the parents 
filed a due process complaint the very same day they 
reasonably discovered the injury, the child’s compensatory 
education for the three years of this violation would be 
capped at two years (the second and third grade years that 
occurred within the two years before the filing of the 
complaint).  Moreover, those two years of compensatory 
education would diminish daily for each day after the 
reasonable discovery date that the parents or their counsel 
conducted due diligence, explored settlement options, or 
prepared the complaint before filing.  Nothing in the plain 
language of the statute suggests such an absurd result.  Cf. 
Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 267 (1993) (“While it is 
theoretically possible for a statute to create a cause of action 
that accrues at one time for the purpose of calculating when 
the statute of limitations begins to run, but at another time for 
the purpose of bringing suit, we will not infer such an odd 
result in the absence of any such indication in the statute.”).11  
                                              
11 Perhaps for this reason, at oral argument, the District 
took another tack, stating that if a parent’s complaint was 
filed “very close in time” to the reasonable discovery date—
that is, if a parent only waited a week or two to file a 
complaint, versus the two years he or she is entitled under the 
statute—a child would not lose any remedy at all.  Oral Arg. 
at 13:25, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-
argument-recordings.  This supposed two-week grace period, 




Putting aside the oddity of a statute of limitations 
functioning in this manner and its inconsistency with the 
broad remedial purposes of the IDEA (discussed more fully 
below), the text is clear that Congress eschewed the 
occurrence rule in favor of the discovery rule by hinging both 
§ 1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B) on the date the parents 
“knew or should have known” of the injury.  See, e.g., Merck 
& Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 651 (2010) (holding that 
when a “statute says that the plaintiff’s claim accrues only 
after the ‘discovery’ of . . . facts,” a limitations period does 
not “begin before ‘discovery’ can take place”); Beauty Time, 
Inc. v. VU Skin Sys., Inc., 118 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(“It is well-established that Pennsylvania law recognizes an 
exception to the statute of limitations which delays the 
running of the statute until the plaintiff knew, or through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the 
injury and its cause.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Thus, the limitations period of § 1415(f)(3)(C) “begins to run 
once the plaintiff did discover or a reasonably diligent 
plaintiff would have discovered the facts constituting the 
violation—whichever comes first.”  Merck & Co., 559 U.S. at 
653 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).12  
                                              
 12 The discovery rule, of course, has a practical and 
“fundamental difference” with general equitable tolling 
doctrines, Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1390, the concept we 
considered with regards to the IDEA in D.K., 696 F.3d at 
245-47.  Specifically, “[t]he purpose of the discovery rule is 
to determine . . . when the statute of limitations [effectively] 
begins to run.”  Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1390.  Our general 
equitable tolling doctrine, on the other hand, “steps in to toll, 
or stop, the running of the statute of limitations in light of 
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Accordingly, § 1415(b)(6)(B), which runs backward from the 
reasonable discovery date (not the filing date), appears on its 
face to mean something different and, whatever that is, it is 
not, as the District would have it, that claims not known or 
reasonably known expire of their own accord if the injury 
occurred more than two years before the filing date.  
ii. G.L.’s 2+2 and Pleading 
Requirement Theories 
  In a diametrically different but no less problematic 
reading, G.L. argues that the text of § 1415(b)(6)(B) supports 
two interpretations, each of which entitles him to relief.  First, 
he argues that the District Court’s 2+2 approach was 
correct—that § 1415(b)(6)(B) provides a two-year window 
before the reasonable discovery date within which he may 
claim IDEA violations occurred, thus effectively serving as a 
four-year remedy cap.  Second, he argues, along with Amici 
Appellees,13 that this subsection is merely the description of a 
                                                                                                     
established equitable considerations,” despite a plaintiff’s 
discovery of his or her injury.  Id. 
13 G.L. focused his argument almost exclusively on the 
2+2 rule, candidly explaining at oral argument that, because 
he only alleged two years of violations, the Court’s adoption 
of that rule would give him complete relief.  He did, however, 
also support the broader position urged by Amici Appellees, 
i.e., that properly construed, neither § 1415(f)(3)(C) nor 
§ 1415(b)(6)(B) imposed a cap on remedies.  Even if G.L. 
had not espoused this interpretation of the statute, we are 
bound, “on the basis of our independent judgment, [to] 
exercis[e] a plenary review of the purely legal question[] 
presented” to us by the parties, pursuant to “our duty to 
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prima facie cause of action, with no limit on remedy at all.  
That is, § 1415(b)(6)(B) requires that a due process complaint 
allege an injury under the IDEA that occurred within two 
years of a parent’s reasonable discovery, but imposes no 
limitation on the remedy if these elements are pleaded and the 
complaint is timely filed.   
Both of these interpretations, however, would render 
the text illogical.  For like § 1415(f)(3)(C), § 1415(b)(6)(B) 
provides in the very same sentence that if a “State has an 
explicit time limitation for presenting such a complaint,” the 
complaint shall instead be filed “in such time as the State law 
allows,” rather than the time described in § 1415(b)(6)(B), 
and further provides that if the state does enact its own statute 
of limitations, the federal exceptions still apply to the state’s 
statute of limitations.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B).  Yet, it 
would be nonsensical for Congress to specify that a federal 
statute’s remedy cap or the elements of a prima facie case be 
replaced by a state’s statute of limitations, and it would be 
equally illogical to have two bases for equitable tolling—a 
doctrine used to determine whether a statute of limitations has 
expired—apply to a provision that is not a statute of 
limitations in the first place.  We decline to interpret the 
                                                                                                     
interpret statutory provisions” and accord them the meaning 
that Congress intended.  Vornado, Inc. v. Trs. of the Retail 
Store Emps.’ Union Local 1262, 829 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 
1987); see also Loretangeli v. Critelli, 853 F.2d 186, 189 n.5 
(3d Cir. 1988) (“This court may consider a pure question of 
law even if not raised below . . . where the issue’s resolution 




statute in this bizarre fashion.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue of 
Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 343 (1994) (rejecting 
statutory interpretation that would render a statute “illogical” 
and contrary to congressional intent).   
In sum, the supposedly straightforward textual 
arguments of the parties more resemble the twists and bends 
of a contortion artist, presenting us with the option, on the one 
hand, of ignoring swaths of the statutory text or, on the other, 
accepting a reading that is absurd on its face.  The parties’ 
positions are illustrative, however, of the difficulty of 
applying a plain language reading to this text.  We conclude, 
as we observed in addressing the pre-2004 version of the 
IDEA, “the language of section 1415(b)(6) is at best 
ambiguous.”  Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. New Jersey, 417 
F.3d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 2005).14  We therefore must resort to 
other tools of statutory construction. 
B. Statutory Interpretation of                   
§ 1415(b)(6)(B) 
The Supreme Court has instructed that “[t]he 
meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may 
only become evident when placed in context.”  F.D.A. v. 
                                              
 14 In Lawrence, we addressed whether a school district 
had standing to bring a private right of action under § 
1415(b)(6) and concluded the provision was intended to 
provide a private right of action only to disabled children and 
their parents.  417 F.3d at 371-72.  While the question was 
wholly unrelated and we were addressing a pre-amendment 
version of the IDEA, our observation about the opacity of § 
1415(b)(6) pertains even more so to the amended version. 
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Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 
(2000).  That is, “[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in 
isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory 
scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings 
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest 
of the law.”  United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood 
Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); accord 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.  v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 
484 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1987) (analyzing statutory language in a 
way that is in accord with the “language and structure” of the 
section of law at issue).  Such is the case here, where 
examining § 1415(b)(6)(B) in the context of § 1415 and the 
IDEA as a whole points unequivocally in one direction: that 
§ 1415(b)(6)(B) indeed restates § 1415(f)(3)(C)’s two-year 
statute of limitations and that this limitations period functions 
in a traditional way, that is, as a filing deadline that runs from 
the date of reasonable discovery and not as a cap on a child’s 
remedy for timely-filed claims that happen to date back more 
than two years before the complaint is filed.   
i. The Structure, Language, and 
Context of the Act 
We begin with the overarching structure of § 1415.  
See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59-60; Evankavitch v. Green Tree 
Servicing, LLC, 793 F.3d 355, 363 (3d Cir. 2015) (examining 
the “structure and . . . parallels” of a statute to determine the 
meaning of its terms).  As previously noted, after opening 
with a preamble that reiterates that a state must “establish and 
maintain procedures . . . to ensure that children with 
disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural 
safeguards,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a), the section next proceeds to 
list and briefly describe the “[t]ypes of procedures” mandated 
by the IDEA, id. § 1415(b).  That listing, in § 1415(b), serves 
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in effect as a table of contents for the expanded descriptions 
of these same procedures that then appear in roughly the same 
order in § 1415(c)-(f).  Thus, for example, § 1415(b)(3) 
requires written prior notice of changes to a child’s 
educational program, the details of which are described in 
§ 1415(c)(1); § 1415(b)(4) ensures notice is available in a 
parent’s native language, as described in § 1415(d)(2); 
§ 1415(b)(5) provides “[a]n opportunity for mediation,” as 
described in § 1415(e); and, as relevant here, § 1415(b)(6) 
provides an “[a]n opportunity for any party to present a 
complaint,” which is more fully described in § 1415(f).  Id. 
§ 1415(b)-(f).  This structure makes clear that § 1415(b) was 
intended to preview and convey the same essential meaning 
as § 1415(f).  
Given that § 1415(b), in context, appears to be nothing 
more than a summary listing of the procedural safeguards 
more fully described in later subsections, we cannot conceive 
that Congress intended to bury within § 1415(b)(6) a sea 
change in the IDEA.  That, however, would be the effect of 
cutting off at twenty four months in virtually all cases the 
courts’ power to award compensatory education, and 
“le[aving] parents without an adequate remedy when a school 
district unreasonably fail[s] to identify a child with 
disabilities.”  Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 
245 (2009) (noting “Congress’ acknowledgment of the 
paramount importance of properly identifying each child 
eligible for services”).  This proposition appears particularly 
fanciful considering that Congress failed to even hint at such 
an intention either in § 1415(f), the full version of the due 
process hearing procedure of which § 1415(b)(6) is merely a 
précis, or in § 1415(i), which was reenacted in 2004 without 
any alteration to the “broad discretion” it grants federal courts 
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to remedy violations of the IDEA, Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 
238.  As the Supreme Court “ha[s] repeatedly said[,] . . . 
Congress ‘does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it 
does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.’”  
E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 
1612 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). 
Moreover, it is “[a] standard principle of statutory 
construction . . . that identical words and phrases within the 
same statute should normally be given the same meaning.”  
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 
232 (2007).  Here, the words and phrases describing the 
IDEA’s statute of limitations and its exceptions indicate that 
§ 1415(b) was intended to have the same meaning as the other 
references to a limitations period in § 1415, and, like them, to 
function as a filing deadline and not a remedy cap.  
Specifically, in three separate subsections of § 1415, the 
statute provides a federal time limit, but—using identical 
language—provides as an alternative: “or, if the State has an 
explicit time limitation . . . , in such time as the State law 
allows.”  20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f)(3)(C), (i)(2)(B).  Given 
that state limitations periods generally function as filing 
deadlines on claims that are known or should have been 
known, not remedy caps on claims not yet reasonably 
knowable, the only way those words can be read sensibly is if 
they provide an alternative to a federal filing deadline, i.e., a 
traditional statute of limitations. 
“Textual cross-reference confirms this conclusion,” 
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994), for 
§ 1415(b)(6)(B) not only mirrors § 1415(f)(3)(C)’s state 
statute of limitations provision but also its two equitable 
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tolling exceptions, and does so simply by cross-referencing 
the “the exceptions to the timeline described in 
[§ 1415(f)(3)(D)],” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)(3)(C).  This 
shorthand reference to these important tolling provisions, 
which are then set forth in full in § 1415(f), fortifies our 
conclusion that § 1415(b)(6) was merely intended as an 
abstract of § 1415(f), that it reflects the same limitations 
period as § 1415(f)(3)(C), and that this limitations period, 
pursuant to the “cooperative federalism” inherent in the 
IDEA, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 
(2005) (quoting Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 
816, 830 (8th Cir. 1999)), defers to state limitations periods 
when appropriate and otherwise functions as a traditional 
statute of limitations—not a remedy cap. 
Indeed, while it would make no sense for a state filing 
deadline to displace a federal remedy cap or elements of a 
prima facie case, it makes perfect sense that Congress, 
according due weight to principles of federalism, would allow 
a state filing deadline to displace a federal one.  Likewise, it 
would be odd indeed for § 1415(b)(6)(B), if it actually 
described a remedy cap or a prima facie case, to apply 
equitable tolling provisions from § 1415(f)(3)(D), but quite 
logical if § 1415(b)(6)(B) merely restates the statute of 
limitations to which those equitable exceptions apply.  That 
is, when we “look to the [section’s] surrounding words and 
provisions and their context,” Tavarez v. Klingensmith, 372 
F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2004), and apply “the cardinal rule that 
a statute is to be read as a whole,” King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 
502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991), it is clear that § 1415(b)(6)(B), 
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though poorly penned, was intended merely as a synopsis of 
§ 1415(f)(3)(D)’s statute of limitations.15 
ii. Forest Grove and the Canon 
against Sub Silentio Repeal 
Even if the structure, language, and context of the 
IDEA left room for doubt, we would be loath to interpret 
§ 1415(b)(6)(B) as constricting the remedies available under 
the IDEA in view of the statute’s broad remedial purpose, see 
A.W., 486 F.3d at 803, codified, among other places, in          
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).  That subsection provides that a court 
“shall grant such relief as the court determines is 
appropriate,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), and, in a long 
line of cases, the Supreme Court and this Circuit have held 
that it should be interpreted expansively to provide a 
comprehensive remedy for children deprived of a FAPE.  See, 
e.g., Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 237-38 (“In determining the 
                                              
 15 Given the structure of this statute, which includes at 
the outset a digest of the multiple procedural safeguards that 
are each expounded upon in later subsections, we also discern 
no tension between our interpretation of § 1415(b)(6)(B) and 
the canon against superfluity.  Moreover, that canon “assists 
only where a competing interpretation gives effect ‘to every 
clause and word of a statute.’”  Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 
P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2248 (2011) (quoting Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).  We can identify no 
competing interpretation that could give logical meaning to 
all the words of § 1415(b)(6)(B), and thus conclude this is a 
quintessential case where “rigorous application of the canon 
does not seem a particularly useful guide to a fair 
construction of the statute.”  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.   
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scope of the relief authorized, . . . the ordinary meaning of 
these words confers broad discretion on the court and . . . 
absent any indication to the contrary, what relief is 
appropriate must be determined in light of the Act’s broad 
purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Bucks Cnty. Dep’t of 
Mental Health, 379 F.3d at 67 (“We . . . have broadly 
interpreted the term ‘appropriate’” and “discerned nothing in 
the text or history suggesting that relief under IDEA is limited 
in any way. . . .” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
and alterations omitted)); see also D.E., 765 F.3d at 273 
(examining the IDEA’s purpose and rejecting a statutory 
interpretation which “would ‘create an enormous loophole’ in 
a school district’s obligations under the IDEA, while 
‘substantially weaken[ing] the IDEA’s protections’ for 
students” (alteration in original) (quoting D.F., 694 F.3d at 
497)).  
Given the broad remedial scheme of the IDEA, neither 
in the period before the 2004 amendments—when we 
borrowed a state’s most analogous statutory cause of action to 
determine how long after an adverse decision by a hearing 
officer a parent could wait before filing an IDEA complaint in 
state or federal court16—nor in the period since, have we 
imposed a cap on the remedy a child could seek for timely-
filed claims.  Instead, we have consistently repeated that a 
                                              
 16 See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 
F.3d 238, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Blunt v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 270 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(observing that “[p]rior to the [2004] amendment of the IDEA 
. . . , the time for bringing suit . . . after receiving an adverse 
administrative determination had been two years”). 
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child’s right to compensatory education “accrue[s] from the 
point that the school district knows or should know” of the 
injury to the child, and the child “is entitled to compensatory 
education for a period equal to the period of deprivation, but 
excluding the time reasonably required for the school district 
to rectify the problem.”  M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. 
Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396-97 (3d Cir. 1996); see also D.F., 694 
F.3d at 499 (repeating standard); Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2009) (same); Lauren W. 
ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 
2007) (same).  That standard is grounded in our 
understanding, then and now, that “a child’s entitlement to 
special education should not depend upon the vigilance of the 
parents (who may not be sufficiently sophisticated to 
comprehend the problem) nor be abridged because the 
district’s behavior did not rise to the level of slothfulness or 
bad faith.”  M.C., 81 F.3d at 397. 
Against the backdrop of these cases and the broad 
interpretation the Supreme Court has given to a court’s 
remedial power under § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), it bears particular 
significance that Congress reenacted that subsection without 
change as part of the 2004 reenactment.  Thus, interpreting 
the IDEA’s statute of limitations as a remedy cap would also 
disregard the well-settled canon of statutory interpretation 
that “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative 
or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that 
interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.”  
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); see also Tex. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2015). 
On this point, we find clear guidance in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Forest Grove, which examined the 1997 
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amendments to the IDEA.  Those amendments added, among 
other things, § 1412(a)(10)(C), which provided that if the 
parents of a special-needs child “who previously received 
special education and related services under the authority of a 
public agency” enrolled their child in private school without 
the consent or referral of that public agency, a school district 
could still be ordered to provide tuition reimbursement if a 
fact-finder determined that the school district failed to 
provide a student with a FAPE in the first instance.  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).  In an attempt to limit liability, a school 
district argued that because the IDEA “only discusses 
reimbursement for children who have previously received 
special-education services through the public school, [the] 
IDEA only authorizes reimbursement in that circumstance.”  
557 U.S. at 241.   
The Supreme Court disagreed.  It observed that the 
1997 amendments preserved the IDEA’s comprehensive 
remedial goal of providing every child with a FAPE and did 
not alter 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).  See id. at 243 n.10 
(stating that the holdings in School Committee of Burlington 
v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 
(1985), and Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 
510 U.S. 7 (1993), “rested . . . on the breadth of the authority 
conferred by § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), the interest in providing 
relief consistent with the Act’s purpose, and the injustice that 
a contrary reading would produce—considerations that were 
not altered by the 1997 Amendments” (internal citations 
omitted)).  The Court thus rejected the notion that Congress 
repealed sub silentio those previous Supreme Court holdings 
describing the “broad discretion” afforded by 
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).  Id. at 243.  Any other reading, the Court 
reasoned, would be contrary to the IDEA’s broad remedial 
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purpose and a “child’s right to a free appropriate education . . 
. would be less than complete.”  Id. at 244-45 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370). 
So too here, for the 2004 reauthorization reaffirmed 
the IDEA’s first purpose as “ensur[ing] that all children with 
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public 
education . . . designed to meet their unique needs,” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(d)(1)(A), and once more left unchanged 
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), which grants courts the broad discretion 
to fashion remedies that accomplish that objective.  
Congress’s purpose in that mandate is clear:  In order to 
effectuate the law’s broad remedial goals, a court finding a 
deprivation of a free appropriate public education should 
return a child to the educational path he or she would have 
traveled had the educational agency provided that child with 
an appropriate education in the first place.  See D.F., 694 F.3d 
at 498-99; Reid, 401 F.3d at 518; see also Ridgewood, 172 
F.3d at 251 (remanding to district court to consider eight 
years of claims for compensatory education); Lester H. by 
Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(affirming grant of thirty months of compensatory education). 
Consistent with that purpose and the traditional way in 
which a discovery-based statute of limitations functions, 
courts since the passage of the 2004 reenactment have 
routinely affirmed awards of compensatory education that 
remedy deprivations of greater than two years, or at 
minimum, remanded for an administrative agency to consider 
those claims.  See Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 
712, 715 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming award of three years of 
compensatory education); M.S. ex rel. Simchick v. Fairfax 
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 553 F.3d 315, 324 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that the broad discretion afforded under the IDEA allowed a 
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district court to consider reimbursement for three years of a 
child’s allegedly inappropriate placement); Draper v. Atl. 
Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275, 1286-90 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting a school district’s argument that a child’s long-
undiscovered injury was time barred and upholding an award 
of approximately five years of compensatory education); 
Reid, 401 F.3d at 526 (remanding to consider claims over a 
four and half year period of time); K.H. v N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Educ., No. 12-1680, 2014 WL 3866430, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 6, 2014) (finding that “the IDEA’s clear statutory 
language mandates” that a remedy is not limited by the statute 
of limitations when a claim is timely filed); Jefferson Cnty. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Lolita S., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1123 (N.D. 
Ala. 2013) (holding that a right to redress for a complaint 
filed in October 2011 would be limited to the most recent two 
years “unless . . . the statute did not begin to run on the claim 
because the parent did not know/should not have known 
about that action until a time within two years of the due 
process request”).  But see Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413, 
Marshall v. H.M.J., No. 14-2114, 2015 WL 4744505, at *11 
(D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2015) (“No party may recover for a 
violation occurring outside the two-year statute of 
limitations.”). 
Of course, the IDEA’s statute of limitations does still 
practically curtail remedy, for it “specif[ies] when a 
[complaint] is timely filed” and thus “has the consequence of 
limiting liability because filing a timely [complaint] is a 
prerequisite to having an actionable claim.”  Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 120 (2002).  In 
context, however, that means simply that once a violation is 
reasonably discovered by the parent, any claim for that 
violation, however far back it dates, must be filed within two 
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years of the “knew or should have known” date.  If it is not, 
all but the most recent two years before the filing of the 
complaint will be time-barred; but if it is timely filed, then, 
upon a finding of liability, the entire period of the violation 
should be remedied.  In other words, § 1415(f)(3)(C), like its 
synopsis in § 1415(b)(6)(B), reflects a traditional statute of 
limitations. 
iii. The Department of Education’s 
Regulation and Interpretation 
 The DOE, the federal agency charged with 
promulgating regulations for the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1406, 
agrees that § 1415(b)(6)(B) and § 1415(f)(3)(C) state the 
same limitations period.   
 In its regulations following the 2004 reenactment, the 
DOE simply reproduced both subsections verbatim.  
Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B), and 1415(f)(3)(C), with 
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507(a)(2), and 300.511(e).  In its Analysis 
of Comments and Changes to those regulations, however, the 
DOE reported that commenters were confused and sought 
guidance, “because the statute of limitations is mentioned 
twice and implies that the timeline for filing a complaint and 
filing a request for a due process hearing are different.”  
Assistance to States for the Education of Children with 
Disabilities & Preschool Grants for Children with 
Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006).  It 
responded that “[t]he statute of limitations in section 
[1415(b)(6)(B)] of the Act is the same as the statute of 
limitations in section [1415(f)(3)(C)] of the Act.”  Id.   
 In this appeal, at our request, the DOE also submitted 
an amicus letter brief in which it reiterated its position that the 
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subsections are, in fact, referencing a single statute of 
limitations.17   
 We afford the DOE’s interpretation of its regulation 
and its position before us here “‘respect’ . . . to the extent it 
has the ‘power to persuade,’” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 
243, 256 (2006) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944)); see id. at 256-57 (holding that an agency’s 
interpretation of regulations that merely parrot the statute are 
accorded Skidmore deference, rather than the higher 
deference generally accorded to interpretive guidance under 
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)).  Here, we find the 
DOE’s position persuasive because it accords with the 
language, structure and purpose of the statute, and it is yet 
one more voice in a harmonious chorus that § 1415(b)(6)(B) 
was intended to reiterate § 1415(f)(3)(C)’s two-year statute of 
limitations. 
                                              
17 The IDEA also tasks the DOE with promulgating a 
model notice of procedural safeguards.  20 U.S.C. § 1417(e).  
In that model notice, it again repeated the language of 
§ 1415(b)(6), but cautioned states that if they “established a 
specific timeframe for requesting a hearing under the IDEA 
that is different than two years (either shorter or longer), 
revise the above statement to reflect that timeframe.”  United 
States Department of Education, Part B Procedural 
Safeguards Notice, 17 (2009), 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/modelform-
safeguards.doc.  Again, such a caution to revise the 
limitations notice shorter or longer based on a state’s statute 
of limitations only makes sense if § 1415(b)(6)(B) is, in fact, 
a statute of limitations.   
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 To the extent there remains any doubt about this 
conclusion, it is put to rest by the legislative history, to which 
we next turn. 
iv. The Legislative History of the 
2004 IDEA Amendments 
“Supreme Court cases declaring that clear language 
cannot be overcome by contrary legislative history are 
legion.”  First Merchs. Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & 
Co., 198 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 1999) (collecting cases).  
That said, legislative history can play a confirmatory role in 
resolving ambiguity when statutory language and structure 
support a given interpretation.  See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land 
Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586-91 (2004); Catwell v. Att’y 
Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2010).  This is such a case. 
A legislature designing a statute of limitations 
confronts certain choices.  As we have discussed, it can set 
the date from which the limitations period begins to run by 
using the occurrence rule or the discovery rule.  See supra at 
23-26.  It also can set the expiration date either by counting 
forward from that occurrence or discovery date to the filing of 
a complaint or by counting backward from the date a 
complaint is filed to the occurrence or discovery date.   
When the House of Representatives proposed the 
amendment that was eventually incorporated into 
§ 1415(b)(6), it chose to use the occurrence rule and to count 
backward, providing that parents would have: 
(6) an opportunity to present complaints– 
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(A) with respect to any matter relating to the 
identification, evaluation, or educational 
placement of the child, or the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to such child; and 
(B) which set forth a violation that occurred not 
more than one year before the complaint is 
filed; 
H.R. Rep. 108-77, at 254 (2003).  The House committee’s 
report unambiguously described this language as a one-year 
statute of limitations.  Id. at 115-16 (“Statute of limitations[:] 
The Act currently has no statute of limitations and leaves 
local educational agencies open to litigation for the entire 
length of time a child is in school, whether or not the child 
has been identified as a child with a disability. . . . The bill 
includes a statute of limitations of one year from the date of 
the violation . . . .).  And as written, it would have 
unambiguously functioned like one, barring claims based on 
injuries that occurred more than twelve months before the 
complaint was filed. 
 The Senate, meanwhile, chose to use the discovery 
rule and to count forward, providing in what became 
§ 1415(f)(3)(C):  
Timeline for requesting hearing.–A parent or 
public agency shall request an impartial due 
process hearing within 2 years of the date the 
parent or public agency knew or should have 
known about the alleged action that forms the 
basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an 
explicit time limitation for requesting such a 
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hearing under this part, in such time as the State 
law allows. 
S. Rep. 108-185, at 222 (2003).  Unlike the House’s proposal, 
the Senate’s also added the provision giving primacy to a 
state’s limitations period, along with the two statutory tolling 
exceptions.     
 Those two bills—both statutes of limitations but 
pointing in different directions and using different starting 
dates for the limitations period—then went to conference 
where the conference committee sought to reconcile them.  
That committee reaffirmed that each body’s amendment 
functioned as a traditional statute of limitations on the filing 
of a complaint:  
The House bill and Senate amendment have 
similar language regarding the opportunity to 
present complaints, but the House bill, not the 
Senate amendment, includes language 
establishing a 1 year statute of limitations on 
the right to present complaints. Senate has a 2 
year timeline for filing complaints at note 221. 
H.R. Rep. 108-779, at 213 n.193 (2004) (Conf. Rep.), 
reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2480, 2527; see also id. at 
218 n.221, 2532 (“The Senate amendment establishes a 2-
year statute of limitations unless State law already has a 
statute of limitations.  The House bill includes a 1-year statute 
of limitations (see note 193).”).   
Apparently concluding that the addition of a statute of 
limitations should involve both a new provision within 
§ 1415(f)(3)(C) and an amendment to its prefatory subsection 
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at § 1415(b)(6), the conference committee opted not to 
choose one body’s addition over the other but to retain both.  
It did so by conforming each and every of the material terms 
of the House’s version to the Senate’s, i.e., by changing the 
House’s limitations period from one year to two, changing the 
occurrence rule to the discovery rule, adding that a state’s 
statute of limitations could override the IDEA’s, and adding 
the two equitable tolling provisions specified by the Senate.  
The conference committee then incorporated the Senate’s 
version at § 1415(f) and the House’s version in the summary 
listing at § 1415(b).  When it did so, however, it omitted to 
change the backward-looking framework of the House’s 
version to the forward-looking framework of the Senate’s.  
Thus was created the problem we grapple with today. 
Section 1415(b)(6), in other words, started in the 
House as a functioning, one-year statute of limitations for the 
filing of complaints: 
(A) with respect to any matter relating to the 
identification, evaluation, or educational 
placement of the child, or the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to such child; and 
(B) which set forth a violation that occurred 
not more than one year before the complaint 
is filed[.] 
H.R. Rep. 108-77, at 254 (emphasis added).   
 It ended, however, as something different altogether:  
(A) with respect to any matter relating to the 
identification, evaluation, or educational 
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placement of the child, or the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to such child; and 
(B) which set forth an alleged violation that 
occurred not more than two years before the 
date the parent or public agency knew or 
should have known about the alleged action 
that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the 
State has an explicit time limitation for 
presenting such a complaint under this 
subchapter, in such time as the State law allows, 
except that the exceptions to the timeline 
described in subsection (f)(3)(D) shall apply to 
the timeline described in this subparagraph. 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (emphasis added). 
 The Congressional Research Service described the 
amendments this way: 
The 2004 reauthorization includes statutes of 
limitations in various sections. As previously 
discussed [Section 1415(b)] provides for a 
two-year statute of limitations regarding the 
filing of a complaint. There is also a two-year 
statute of limitations regarding requests for a 
hearing. The two years is from the date the 
parent or agency knew or should have known 
about the alleged action.  
Richard N. Appling and Nancy Lee Jones, Cong. Research 
Serv., RL32716, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA): Analysis of Changes Made by P.L. 108-446, CRS-27 
(2005) (emphasis added).  While this post-enactment 
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observation on its own carries little weight, nothing in the 
IDEA’s legislative history points to a contrary interpretation.   
In fact, quite the opposite.  Far from Congress 
intending that the two limitations periods diverge or limit a 
court’s remedial power under § 1415(i), the legislative history 
reflects that the drafters intended the amendments to add a 
single statute of limitations and to leave untouched the 
IDEA’s broad remedies.  For example, in its explanation of 
the addition of the statute of limitations, the Senate report 
stated:  
This new provision is not intended to alter the 
principle under IDEA that children may receive 
compensatory education services, as affirmed in 
School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of 
Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 
(1985) and Florence County School District 
Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993) and 
otherwise limited under section 
[1412(a)(10)(C)] . . . . In essence, where the 
issue giving rise to the claim is more than two 
years old and not ongoing, the claim is barred; 
where the conduct or services at issue are 
ongoing to the previous two years, the claim 
for compensatory education services may be 
made on the basis of the most recent conduct 
or services and the conduct or services that 
were more than two years old at the time of 
due process or the private placement . . . . 
S. Rep. 108-185, 40 (emphasis added). 
48 
 
 After conference, but before final passage, Senator 
Harkin, a co-sponsor of the amendments, addressed the 
addition of a statute of limitations this way:  
In this reauthorization, we also include a 2-year 
statute of limitations on claims. However, it 
should be noted that this limitation is not 
designed to have any impact on the ability of a 
child to receive compensatory damages for the 
entire period in which he or she has been 
deprived of services. The statute of limitations 
goes only to the filing of the complaint, not 
the crafting of remedy. This is important 
because it is only fair that if a school district 
repeatedly failed to provide services to a child, 
they should be required to provide 
compensatory services to rectify this problem 
and help the child achieve despite the school’s 
failings. 
Therefore, compensatory education must 
cover the entire period and must belatedly 
provide all education and related services 
previously denied and needed to make the 
child whole.  
150 Cong. Rec. S11851 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement 
of Sen. Tom Harkin) (emphasis added); see also Robert R. v. 
Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., No. 05-1282, 2005 WL 3003033, 
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2005) (examining the IDEA’s 
legislative history and concluding that “the limitations period 
placed on claims for compensatory education by the [2004] 
amendment to the IDEA was not meant to limit the period 
which the hearing officer could consider when a due process 
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hearing was timely brought”); Jennifer Rosen Valverde, A 
Poor IDEA: Statute of Limitations Decisions Cement Second-
Class Remedial Scheme for Low-Income Children with 
Disabilities in the Third Circuit, 41 Fordham Urb. L.J. 599, 
643-646 (2013).  The legislative history is thus crystal clear 
that Congress intended to impose a single statute of 
limitations, but otherwise not to limit a court’s power to 
remedy the deprivation of a free appropriate education. 
V. Conclusion 
 As a general rule, “[t]he plain meaning of legislation 
should be conclusive.”  United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).  However, in the “rare cases 
[in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a 
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters,” the plain meaning need not control.  Id. (alteration 
in original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 
U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).  In those exceptional instances where 
“it is uncontested that legislative intent is at odds with the 
literal terms of the statute, . . . [our] primary role is to 
effectuate the intent of Congress even if a word in the statute 
instructs otherwise.”  Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 278 (3d 
Cir. 2006); accord Thorpe v. Borough of Thorpe, 770 F.3d 
255, 263 (3d Cir. 2014).   
 Here, the language, context, and structure of § 1415 
lead inexorably to one conclusion: § 1415(b)(6)(B) was 
intended to reflect the same statute of limitations set forth in  
§ 1415(f)(3)(C).  To the extent that some of its language 
appears to conflict with that conclusion, the legislative history 
confirms what is apparent from our analysis of the statute 
itself.  That is, the inconsistent language reflects nothing more 
than a drafting error in the reconciliation process, turning a 
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passage that was at each stage of the legislative process 
thought to be a statute of limitations into something that both 
contravenes congressional intent and renders the statute 
illogical.  Thus, the IDEA “needs common sense revision,” 
Morgan, 466 F.3d at 279, reflecting congressional intent that 
a due process complaint must be presented “within 2 years” 
of a parent’s reasonable discovery date, not that remedies be 
limited to injuries that occurred “not more than 2 years 
before” that date. 
 The upshot of all this is two-fold.  On the one hand, 
although a child’s right to special education under the IDEA 
does not turn on parental vigilance, M.C., 81 F.3d at 397, 
parental vigilance is vital to the preservation and enforcement 
of that right.  As we made clear in D.K., claims that are 
known or reasonably should be known to parents must be 
brought within two years of that “knew or should have 
known” date, and parents may not, without satisfying one of 
the two statutory exceptions, knowingly sit on their rights or 
attempt to sweep both timely and expired claims into a single 
“continuing violation” claim brought years later.  696 F.3d at 
248.  Parents are often in a position to be forceful advocates 
for their children and through their vigilance and 
perseverance to help fulfill the IDEA’s promise of a free 
appropriate public education.  That “cooperative process . . . 
between parents and schools” that results from a parent’s 
action, after all, is at the very “core of the statute” itself.  
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53.  Thus the sooner parents start that 
process and secure appropriate intervention and remedial 
supports after they discover or reasonably should have 
discovered the need for it, the better for the well-being of the 
child, the goals of the school district, and the relationship 
between the family and school administrators.   
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 On the other hand, where parents neither knew nor 
reasonably should have known of the special needs of their 
child or of the educational system’s failure to respond 
appropriately to those needs, the other partner in this 
endeavor—the school district itself—still has its independent 
duty to identify those needs within a reasonable time period 
and to work with the parents and the IEP team to 
expeditiously design and implement an appropriate program 
of remedial support.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3); see also Forest 
Grove, 557 U.S. at 245; P.P., 585 F.3d at 738.  This is a 
profound responsibility, with the power to change the 
trajectory of a child’s life.  Thus, the corollary to D.K. is that 
when a school district has failed in that responsibility and 
parents have taken appropriate and timely action under the 
IDEA, then that child is entitled to be made whole with 
nothing less than a “complete” remedy.  Forest Grove, 557 
U.S. at 244.  Compensatory education is crucial to achieve 
that goal, and the courts, in the exercise of their broad 
discretion, may award it to whatever extent necessary to make 
up for the child’s lost progress and to restore the child to the 
educational path he or she would have traveled but for the 
deprivation.  See D.F., 694 F.3d at 498-99.  In this way, the 
courts too have an essential function in fulfilling Congress’s 
mandate in the IDEA and enabling each child with special 
needs to reach his or her full potential.  
 For these reasons, we hold today that, absent one of 
the two statutory exceptions found in § 1415(f)(3)(D), parents 
have two years from the date they knew or should have 
known of the violation to request a due process hearing 
through the filing of an administrative complaint and that, 
assuming parents timely file that complaint and liability is 
proven, Congress did not abrogate our longstanding precedent 
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that “a disabled child is entitled to compensatory education 
for a period equal to the period of deprivation, but excluding 
the time reasonably required for the school district to rectify 
the problem.”  D.F., 694 F.3d at 499 (quoting M.C., 81 F.3d 
at 397).    
* * * 
 G.L.’s claim was filed within two years of the date his 
parents knew or reasonably should have known of his injury, 
and thus his right to compensatory education upon proof of a 
violation was not curtailed by the IDEA’s statute of 
limitations.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
decision that his claims for remedy prior to March 2010 were 
not time-barred and will remand to the District Court for 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.  
